The article addresses the question of whether the changing roles of "public actor" states and "private actor" corporations should impact the legal liability of corporations in international law. The classical paradigm viewed international law as the interactions between sovereign nations and thus was viewed as encompassing the rights and duties of states who were the exclusive subjects of international law. However, does this historical distinction remain relevant in our world today? The context of Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") litigation provides an excellent vehicle to examine the issue. The objection to corporate liability under the ATS stems from the dichotomy between public state and private actors. Corporate liability opponents argue that international law involves the relationships between states, or between states and individuals, as opposed to the relationship between juridical entities such as corporations and individuals. Prior academic commentary (as well as some judicial rulings) attempted to bridge the "liability gap" by arguing that since private individuals may have liability for certain jus cogens violations, corporations as exemplars of "individuals", should also have liability. Rather than comparing corporations to private individuals, this Article argues that global corporations can and should be compared to public actor states. Several developments militate strongly in favor of corporate liability. One, the financial power and influence global corporations wield over an individual rivals that of states. Large global corporations now have the ability to cause widespread damage, a power traditionally held only by states, thus eviscerating the distinction between global corporations and states. Two, the line of demarcation between states and corporations has been greatly reduced in recent years as the role and functions of states and private actors have become interchangeable. In recent years private actors have increasingly assumed public roles as states have outsourced public functions and services to private parties. Moreover, the line is further blurred because in a parallel development, state actors are now engaged as private actors through the operation of sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises. The Article discusses these developments and argues that any objection to corporate liability based upon the distinction between states and corporations should be updated to reflect the blurring of the distinction between "public" and "private" actors. If large global corporations can be treated as actors similar to sovereigns, corporations should have similar duties and responsibilities towards the public as a state government. 
INTRODUCTION

Do corporations have liability for violating international law?
This vexing question is the subject of vigorous academic and practical debate in the United States in the context of Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") litigation. 1 The ramifications are substantial. If corporations do not have ATS liability then such entities are effectively immunized from paying damages for violating international law.
2 Defendant corporations have argued that pursuant to international law, juridical entities such as corporations cannot be liable for international law violations. For example, at oral argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum defense counsel argued in response to a question from Justice Breyer that indeed, a fictitious corporation, "Pirates Inc." would have no liability for violating international law by engaging in piracy. 3 The question of corporate liability in ATS litigation bridges the worlds of corporate governance, tort liability, international law and human rights. With the presence of large, sophisticated global defendants, and in the context of severe violations of international law and the ensuing high financial stakes, the question of corporate liability has been the subject of vigorous disagreement and scholarly treatment in both the academic and judicial spheres.
The ATS enables aliens to file civil claims for violations of "the law of nations" or a "treaty of the United States," 5 and is illustrative of the global trend of claims against multi-national defendants over "allegations of corporate misconduct overseas." 6 In recent years, ATS defendants accused of violating international law overseas 7 include global corporations spanning a diverse array of industries: Pfizer ; Yahoo! 10 ; Cisco 11 and Rio Tinto. 12 Development of transnational tort litigation is not surprising since large multinationals have become significant players wielding immense power in determining in the social, economic and legal fate of nations. 13 Indeed, "[s]ome transnational corporations have more economic, social, political, and legal clout than many developing countries." 14 In rejecting corporate liability under the ATS, the Second Circuit in Kiobel, 15 embraced the statist approach to international law. According to the court, "customary international law includes only 'those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.'" 16 The foundational premise relied upon by Kiobel is that the actors in international law are almost exclusively states, 17 therefore private corporations do not have obligations under international law and thus cannot have liability under the ATS. Pursuant to Kiobel, if the international law violator defendant Royal Dutch Petroleum had been a state or public actor there may have been potential liability. However, since the defendant was a corporation -and a corporation cannot violate international law-there can be no liability for the defendant's conduct. Kiobel's rejection of corporate liability in the ATS context has engendered vigorous scholarship 18 and a split of circuit authority in the United States.
19
What is the theoretical foundation of Kiobel's ruling? Citing treatises 20 and other authoritative sources, 21 liability opponents argue that international law involves the relationships between states as opposed to the relationship between juridical entities such as corporations and individuals. Corporate liability opponents believe "sovereign States exclusively are International Persons -i.e., subjects of International Law and neither 'monarchs, diplomatic envoys, private individuals . . . churches . . . chartered companies, nor . . . organized wandering tribes' enjoyed the status of 'International Persons' who are "subject[s] of the Law of Nations." 22 9 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (helping governments commit crimes against their own citizens in order to continue the exploration for crude oil and natural gas). 10 Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles With Chinese Families: Firm Gave Officials Dissidents' E-Mails, Wash. Post D04 (Nov. 14, 2007) (disclosure of a political dissident's e-mail records in China).
11
See John Markoff, Suit Says Cisco Helped China Pursue Falun Gong, N.Y. Times B7 (May 22, 2011) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/technology/23cisco.html) ("Cisco, the maker of internet routing gear, customized its technology to help China track members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, according to a federal lawsuit filed last week by members of the movement.").
12
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, and environmental torts against mining company). 15 621 F.3d 111. In an unusual twist, several days after argument the Court ordered additional briefing on the issue of extraterritoriality. While the appeal to the Supreme Court was based upon the corporate liability question, the Court's affirmance of the Second Circuit opinion in Kiobel was based upon extraterritoriality. See supra n. 7 (explaining the Court's reasoning). 16 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118 (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). 17 The Second Circuit's opinion acknowledged that under certain circumstances individuals may have liability but juridical entities such as corporations cannot be. Id. at 122 ("nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of violations of customary international law-including the employees, managers, officers, and directors of a corporation-as well as anyone who purposefully aids and abets a violation of customary international law."). 18 See e.g., Julian G. 20 See J. L. Brierly, The Law Of Nations: An Introduction To The International Law Of Peace 1 (6th ed. 1963), which defines international law as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another . . . . [A]s a definite branch of jurisprudence the system which we now know as international law is modern, . . . for its special character has been determined by that of the modern European state system, . . . ". 21 See Restatement (Third) Of The Foreign Relations Law Of The United States § 102(1) (1987) , which characterizes rules of international law as those "that [ 27 noting neither the statute itself nor its history excludes corporations; 28 and holding that international law need not be consulted at all since enforcement of international law is left to the domestic remedies of states. 29 However, little analysis exists as to whether the historical dichotomy between formal "states" and private "corporations" remains relevant today as a justification for opposition to corporate liability.
Intriguing questions are raised with respect to whether the changing roles of governments and private corporations should impact the legal liability of corporations. Demarcations between public states and private corporations are no longer sharp. Commenting on the changing roles of public and private actors as exemplified by the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (NSWF), Larry Backer notes "the distinction between law and norm, between public and private spheres . . . collapses within the operational universe of the NSWF."
30
In recent years, private actors have increasingly assumed public roles as states have outsourced public functions and services to private entities such as corporations. Private actors play an increasingly critical role in traditionally governmental functions. For example, large corporations in the food industry have replaced the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's responsibility in guaranteeing the food its citizens eat is safe. 31 In a parallel development, state actors have increasingly assumed the role of private actor by becoming active participants in private markets. Governments are engaged as private actors through the operation of sovereign wealth funds that buy shares on global stock exchanges, invest in malls, and enter into joint ventures with private corporations. This Article will discuss the foundational question and argues that the formalistic distinctions between "public actor states" and "private actor corporations" are no longer pertinent because globalization has "de-emphasis [ed] . . . the integrity of the territorial borders of states" and the changing roles of states and private actors are "questioning the organizational frameworks on which the conventional global order has been based."
32
Both large global corporations and states have the resources that can and do affect people's lives in an unprecedented fashion and degree. Large global corporations are at the epicenter of astonishing 23 See Engle, supra n. 4, at 501 (explaining how international law is dividable into public and private international law). 24 Id. at 502. 25 Courts have used these terms interchangeably. E.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n. 3 ("In this opinion we use the terms 'law of nations' and 'customary international law' 'interchangeably.'"). 26 28 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748 ("The ATS contains no such language and has no such legislative history to suggest that corporate liability was excluded and that only liability of natural persons was intended. We therefore find no basis for holding that there is any such statutory limitation."). 29 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020 ("International law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide how to enforce them."). 30 and multifaceted governance systems "developing outside the state and international public organizations, and beyond the conventionally legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or international hard law." 33 Indeed, a consequence of globalization is the decline of the state's exclusive power over the lives of citizens and the rise of the state-like role of the large corporation. "Globalization has led to a shift in power away from states and towards the private sector, which has resulted in multinational corporations taking a place among the most powerful international actors." 34 Moreover, role reversal has eviscerated the historic differences between states and corporations. "In effect, the state here is using private power to effect public governance objectives. By inverting its role, it can regulate more effectively as a private shareholder than as a state." 35 Furthermore, responsibilities once relegated to states are now devolving to private actors as well. Sovereign wealth funds exemplify this new role. Norway, via its sovereign wealth fund (SWF) "has begun to import into private investment markets the obligations of international law once limited to states." 36 Similar to state actors, corporations are capable of inflicting enormous damage, either directly or by or aiding and abetting. 37 If large global corporations can be treated as actors similar to sovereigns, corporations should "have the same duties and responsibilities towards its constituents as a state government" 38 and the academic underpinning relied upon by Kiobel is eliminated. Accordingly, the holding of Kiobel excluding private corporations as actors with obligations under international law, is incongruous with a globalized world wherein such actors are capable of causing severe harm similar to sovereigns. In Part One, this Article describes the ATS and provides a background to the corporate liability question including a summary of the current appellate case law. In Part Two, the arguments used by liability opponents are explored. In Part Three, arguments are presented demonstrating that the arguments of the liability opponents are no longer relevant and should be discarded.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE CORPORATE LIABILITY QUESTION A. Preliminary considerations
Before discussing the corporate liability question, it is worthwhile to note some unique facets of ATS litigation. Notwithstanding the exceptional aspects of the statute, the ATS provides an excellent structure from which to explore the issue of corporate responsibility for international law violations.
Unique aspects of the ATS
The ATS is an unconventional statute for several reasons. First, it is a 200-year-old statute with very limited existing legislative history. 39 The lack of knowledge regarding the legislative intent also bears on the dearth of information regarding the statute's purpose(s) and goal(s). Second, for nearly 200 years the ATS remained in relative anonymity with only a handful of cases brought under the statute. 40 international proscription of an allegedly violative act becomes more uniform. 43 Until the Supreme Court endorsed Filartiga's understanding that the ATS granted jurisdiction, the opinions were divided on whether the ATS conferred a statutory cause of action. 44 Fourth, the statute explicitly recognizes and incorporates international law. Fifth, while the ATS ostensibly wields extraterritorial reach, the Supreme Court has upheld the presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to the ATS. 45 Finally, the ATS is unique in that it has served as a method to punish (with civil damages) corporate defendants for international crimes. There is a strong policy argument in favor of allowing corporate liability. While criminal liability would tend to deter such conduct and likely lead to a reduction of same, no international court, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), can even prosecute businesses. As currently standing, the ICC does not have such jurisdiction. 
ATS limitations
The ATS does not constitute a tonic to remedy corporate misconduct. Challenges exist for plaintiffs seeking compensation for the conduct of transnational corporations pursuant to the ATS. For example, only defendants subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States can be held accountable. In addition, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality. And courts are under admonition from the U.S. Supreme Court to only allow certain universally-acknowledged violations as predicate offenses. This serves to limit the types of violations that can constitute actionable claims under the ATS. 47 There are also numerous doctrines available to defendants to have cases dismissed such as international comity, forum non conveniens and political question. Numerous suits are dismissed based upon forum non conveniens by courts finding that an alternative forum would be more appropriate. 
Domestic and international contexts
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in public awareness of both possible human rights abuses conducted by multi-national corporations ("MNCs") and the lack of safeguards ensuring good corporate governance. A substantial factor militating in favor of corporate change has been the internet, which provides an inexpensive and convenient method of instant communication and information swapping, thus empowering individuals who possess negative information regarding MNCs and who wish to disseminate the same to shareholders and consumers. Shareholders and institutional investors have commenced pressuring MNCs to adopt and adhere to codes of good corporate conduct. Both individual and institutional stakeholders have begun to exercise their influence in a meaningful way. For example, the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) will only invest in corporations that adhere to the Global Sullivan Principles. These principles are designed to prompt and guide a corporation into sound corporate governance. CalPERS has divested from nations based on the nations' human rights violations.
In the United States, the business community has been a key opponent of ATS suits and of corporate liability in particular. Business interests argue against holding corporations liable, alleging American businesses lose out to competitors who are not subject to ATS suits. These opponents view the ATS mechanism as detrimental to American business interests providing defendants not subject to suit with economic advantages. In addition, policy opponents believe that the ATS is a form of "judicial imperialism" endangering America's relations with other nations who will view ATS suits as a form of interference in their own affairs. Of course, political considerations come into play as some 43 The court held "courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. U.S. administrations are more "ATS friendly" than others. Sometimes courts ask for the view of the U.S. State Department which, depending upon the political winds, may or may not find the suit an interference with U.S. government policy.
49
A global movement towards imposing obligations gained momentum in the 1990s with the United Nations issuing findings and recommendations on the corporate responsibilities under international law. One significant report was released by the UN Commission on Human Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.
50 Another major report was the Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Poltical, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development released by the UN Secretary General. 51 The reports endorse international norms and mechanisms to impose legal duties and regulations on corporations under international law.
The Norwegian SWF represents a major step in the process of imposing international legal obligations on corporations. Through its Ethics Council, the Norwegian SWF reviews companies and will exclude and divest from companies that it believes violate international law and/or engage in unethical corrupt behavior. International politics again plays a role as some nations will object to having its companies divested or placed on an observation status. Norway's SWF decided that its investment portfolio would not include cluster bomb manufacturers and nuclear weapons producers. As a result, certain American companies were banned from the fund. Affected companies included iconic American businesses such as General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Norway's SWF also blacklisted Walmart based upon child labor practices and anti-union activities. The United States Ambassador to Norway stated in response to the divestment of Walmart, that "[a]n accusation of bad ethics is not an abstract thing. They're alleging serious misconduct. It is essentially a national judgment of the ethics of these companies." The statute allows non-U.S. citizens to sue American or foreign 54 defendants in federal court for tortuous conduct constituting a violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law) 55 or a treaty. To be cognizable under the ATS, the conduct violates the "law of nations" if it contravenes well-established recognized norms of international law that involve the mutual interests of nations and have the specter of global relationship impact. 56 Torts that do not meet these requirements cannot form the basis of an ATS suit. 57 Claims are generally framed in the context of egregious violations of human rights such as slavery, 58 war crimes, and 59 crimes against humanity. 60 However, the statute contains no restrictive 49 See . 54 Suit is of course subject to the court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction. In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable to ATS cases although questions regarding the contours remain. See supra n. 7, and accompanying text. 55 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n. 3 ("In this opinion we use the terms 'law of nations' and 'customary international law' interchangeably."). 60 language, and while international law is often framed in a criminal context, suits may be based upon violations of international law in other contexts. 61 Some have argued that commercial bribery and egregious corporate fraud may also be subject to ATS suits. 62 Given that transnational corporations are responsible for misconduct outside the strict limit of human rights violations, such as environmental catastrophes and corruption, it may be a matter of time before such conduct might trigger ATS litigation.
63
For nearly 200 years, relatively few cases were filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. 64 This relative dormancy ended when in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit issued a landmark ruling whereby the statute was relied upon to find that state-sponsored torture was actionable. 65 The issue in Filartiga was whether torture constituted a "violation of the law of nations" and thus cognizable under the ATS. 66 To be actionable, plaintiffs needed to establish there was an international consensus with respect to torture being a violation of international law. 67 According to the Second Circuit, "[i]t is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the [ATS] ."
68
Filartga held that in determining whether specific conduct constituted a violation of international law, a court was to examine judicial opinions, scholarly works and custom. 69 Significantly, the court stated that international law had to be applied as it is used "today" and not from 200 hundred years prior 70 noting that international law evolves over time. 71 The Second Circuit found that torture was a "well-established, universally recognized norm [ ] of international law" that was cognizable under the statute.
72
After Filartiga, plaintiffs commenced vigorously filing ATS cases. Such cases included ones against government officials alleging various human rights abuses. 73 Plaintiffs also commenced suing corporations, usually alleging these defendants aided and abetted the governments or officials in violating international law. 74 In Sosa v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS and held the statute is jurisdictional, 75 thus permitting federal courts to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law noting such law was part of federal common law. 76 The Court held the statute was initially intended to encompass the three primary violations of international law at the time of its enactment: piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe passage. 77 However, the Court endorsed the Filartiga view that international law develops over time and held that courts were available to entertain claims for violations of the "present-day law of nations."
78 Sosa cited approvingly to Filartiga stating, 61 See e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (informed medical consent 79 Simultaneously, the Court urged caution with respect to embracing the types of international law violations that should be cognizable. The Court provided some guidance, namely, to come within the ambit of the ATS, a violation should "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms." 80 Thus, subject to diligent gate keeping, the federal courts were empowered to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law other than the three original paradigm examples. In the years subsequent to Sosa, a variety of such claims were filed and the courts continue to grapple with many of the vigorously debated issues. 81 Regarding corporate liability, the only reference in Sosa was in a footnote wherein the Court stated that "[a] related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual." 82 The footnote was relied upon by Kiobel in holding the question of corporate liability is determined by reference to international law. 83 However, the footnote did not explicitly state or imply there was an issue of corporate liability but addressed whether liability for the type of conduct at issue can be extended to a private actor-such as a corporation. 84 The private actor might be an individual or a corporation and no distinction was articulated. If anything, the Court seemed to be confirming that corporate liability exists under the ATS. 82 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20. 83 Kiobel relied on the footnote in rejecting corporate liability. The court referenced and adopted a footnote in the Supreme Court's 2004 Sosa ruling wherein the Court stated that federal courts must examine international law to decide the question of whether that law "extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued." See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20). Compare Kiobel (invoking footnote 20 to reason that the question of corporate liability must be resolved by reference to international law) with Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11 (positing that Kiobel's reliance on footnote 20 was misplaced). 84 See Slawotsky, supra n. 27, at 35 ("The Court held that international law controls the question of whether the specific conduct alleged gives rise to liability if the defendant is a private non-state actor. The context of the footnote and the reference to Judge Edwards' concurrence in the D.C. Circuit's Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic opinion and to the Second Circuit's Kadic v. Karadžić opinion make it manifestly clear the Court was not questioning the viability of suing corporations."). 85 See e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Marcos Est., 25 F.3d 1467. 86 91 See e.g., S. African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 254 ("On at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has addressed ATCA cases against corporations without ever hinting-much less holding-that such cases are barred.").
the ATS. 92 Kiobel relied upon the Sosa footnote reference to corporations to hold that the question of corporate liability turns on whether international law provides for same. 93 The majority held that pursuant to Supreme Court-ordered guidance in the Sosa opinion, federal courts are to examine international law to decide the question of whether that law "extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued." 94 Relying upon that footnote, Kiobel, examined international law and citing to international criminal tribunals, 95 treaties 96 and scholarship, 97 found such law did not encompass corporate liability. 98 The court based its decision on its conclusion that international law did not involve actors other than states. According to the court, "customary international law includes only 'those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.'"
99
Kiobel ruled that the only actors in international law are states. 100 According to the Second Circuit, it is now up to Congress to decide whether the statute can impose corporate liability but "[f]or now, and for the foreseeable future, the Alien Tort Statute does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims against corporations." analysis conflates the norms of conduct at issue in and the rules for any remedy to be found in federal common law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the import of footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining the sources of customary international law.
103
Citing both Louis Henkin and Judge Edwards' Tel-Oren opinion, the Exxon court ruled that international law itself provides no remedies for its violations, rather individual nations determine whether and how such violations should be addressed. The court stated:
The ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct at issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law of nations must provide the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit. Consequently, the fact that the law of nations provides no private right of action to sue corporations addresses the wrong question and does not demonstrate that corporations are immune from liability under the ATS.
104
The court held the domestic remedy for violations of international law is left for the individual nations. Therefore, the ATS may be used to enforce international law norms.
The Exxon court also relied upon the argument that a corporation is merely a variant of an individual. According to the court, Kiobel is inherently contradictory inasmuch as the Kiobel majority concedes that "individuals" from a corporation may have liability. If, as Kiobel admits, individuals have liability, a juridical entity may also have liability.
Because international law generally leaves all aspects of the issue of civil liability to individual nations, there is no rule or custom of international law to award civil damages in any form or context, either as to natural persons or as to juridical ones. If the absence of a 92 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149. While Judge Leval concurred in the judgment based upon other grounds, he vigorously disagreed on the corporate liability issue. See id. at 151 (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment).
93 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20. 94 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127 ("In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal courts to consider 'whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."). 95 Id. at 132-37. 96 Id. at 137-41. 97 Id. at 142-45. 98 Id. at 148-49. 99 Id. at 118 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Id. at 41. 104 universally accepted rule for the award of civil damages against corporations means that U.S. courts may not award damages against a corporation, then the same absence of a universally accepted rule for the award of civil damages against natural persons must mean that U.S. courts may not award damages against a natural person. But the majority opinion concedes (as it must) that U.S. courts may award damages against the corporation's employees when a corporation violates the rule of nations. Furthermore
105
The decision is also noteworthy in that in broad terms, it embraces the ATS plaintiffs ' 
All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corporations can be liable . . . The outlier is the split decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), which indeed held that because corporations have never been prosecuted, whether criminally or civilly, for violating customary international law, there can't be said to be a principle of customary international law that binds a corporation. The factual premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.
108
As to the substantive corporate liability argument, Flomo disagreed with the Second Circuit and found that international law had in fact been used by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals to punish corporations. 109 The court also held that international law does not control the question of liability which is a matter of domestic enforcement. The court used the following analogy:
If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be punished criminally for violating customary international law, as we believe it could be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of a corporation directs the corporation's managers to commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation can be civilly liable.
***** If a corporation has used slave labor at the direction of its board of directors, then whether the board members should be prosecuted as criminal violators of customary international law-or also or instead be forced to pay damages, compensatory and perhaps punitive as well, to the slave laborers-or, again also or instead, whether the corporation should be prosecuted criminally and/or subjected to tort liability-all these would be remedial questions for the tribunal, in this case our federal judiciary, to answer in light of its experience with particular remedies and its immersion in the nation's legal culture, rather than questions the answers to which could be found in customary international law.
110
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 111 the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C. and Seventh Circuit post-Kiobel rulings finding that corporations may have liability under the ATS. Rejecting defendant Rio Tinto's argument that the ATS does not allow for corporate liability, the court noted that neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history indicates any restrictive language limiting the scope of liability to non-corporations. 112 The court held the appropriate determinative factor for determining whether international law extends liability to a defendant is "not whether there is a specific precedent so holding, but whether international law extends its prohibitions to the perpetrators in question." "Kiobel reflects a deep and significant split at the circuit courts, because it concerns U.S. international legal obligations, because the stakes, in human and financial terms are high, because it was so obviously wrongly decided, the split that Kiobel represents has reached the U.S. Supreme Court." 116 However, the Supreme Court did not rule on the corporate liability issue. While the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's Kiobel dismissal it so ruled based upon the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. The Court held "[o]n these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application." 117 The only reference to corporations was the Court's statement-in the context of whether the conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S.-that " [c] orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices." In a concurrence by Justice Breyer, four Justices rejected the presumption finding the statute provides jurisdiction where:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
119
The issue of corporate liability remains relevant because many of the potential defendants will be U.S. companies and, moreover, even foreign defendants may be unable to invoke the extraterritoriality argument depending on the extent their conduct touches and concerns the U.S.
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The next section discusses the rationale underpinning the argument that corporations do not have obligations under international law and thus bear no liability under the ATS. In support of this view, liability opponents cite to the historical dichotomy between private actor juridical entities such as "corporations" and formal "states". According to liability opponents, the ATS is applicable only to "states" since sovereign nations are the principal actors in international law.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE AGAINST CORPORATE LIABILITY
The question of non-state actor liability for violating international law:
remains an area of substantial academic interest and public activity. In particular, focus has shifted beyond human beings, the "subjects" of international law in areas of armed conflict or human rights, and toward other non-state entities. As Philip Alston suggests, this includes "transnational corporations and other large-scale business entities, private voluntary groups such as churches, labour unions, and human rights groups, and [ ] international organizations including the United Nations itself, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.
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The Court heard two rounds of argument, one on the issue of corporate liability, followed by an unusual Court request for the parties to brief the issue of extraterritoriality (available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argum ent_transcripts/10-1491.pdf). Argument on the extraterritoriality issue was held in October 2012. See http://harvardhum anrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/10-1491rearg.pdf (transcript of oral argument). 116 Engle, supra n. 4, at 500.
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Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. While five Justices so held, Justice Kennedy, part of the majority, stated questions remain regarding the applicability of the presumption to specific cases. "The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute . . . . Other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today's case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Commentators have noted the myriad of possible ways conduct may "touch and concern" the United States. Opinio Juris, Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-symposi um-degrees-of-territoriality/ (noting potential ways conduct may "touch and concern" the U.S. such as planning, financing, designing, profiting) (last accessed June 7, 2013).
118
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. A reasonable inference from the senetence would be the Court is tacitly endorsing corporate liability. 119 Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Corporate liability opponents argue that corporate liability does not comport with international law. 122 The ATS provides that aliens can file claims for violations of "the law of nations" or a "treaty of the United States."
123 Although the terms "international law" and "law of nations" are frequently used interchangeably, 124 as noted by Eric Engle:
The law of nations (jus gentium), colloquially known as international law, is divided into two branches: public international law and private international law (also known as jus gentium privatum). Public international law consists of two further branches, customary international law (jus gentium publicum) and international treaty law (just inter gentes). The United States currently interprets the law of nations, jus gentium, as indicating public international law, even though jus gentium consists of two distinct parts, jus gentium publicum and just gentium privatum.
125
The ATS's "law of nations" therefore should include both public and private international law thereby including "private actors" within the reach of the statute. However, liability opponents have focused on the public international law branch of "the law of nations" to base their arguments that the ATS does not cover non state actors. 126 The classical paradigm of public international law viewed states as "the" actors in international law and private individuals as "the" actors in private international law. 127 It is this perceived gulf of responsibility within public international law between formal state actors and juridical organizations that forms the basis of intellectual opposition to corporate liability under the ATS. 128 Conventionally, international law was defined as: the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another . . . . [A]s a definite branch of jurisprudence the system which we now know as international law is modern . . . for its special character has been determined by that of the modern European state system . . .
129
International law was interpreted as encompassing the rights and duties of states 130 who were thus the exclusive subjects of international law. 131 According to this view,
The lengthy majority opinion issued by the Second Circuit in Kiobel outlines the correct law: The ATS clearly cannot be applied to corporations because they are not liable under customary international law.
132
The statist motif of international law opines "the only real subjects of persons in international law are states and their creations, mainly organizations consisting of states as members such as those of the U.N. system."
133 Essentially, international law was viewed as a series of rules and conduct accepted within the international community of sovereigns excluding juridical organizations, such as corporations, which by definition are not members of the international community of states. 134 Thus, "international law" consisted of the relationships between sovereign nations as opposed to relationships between nations and individuals. 
124
ATS courts have often referred to international law as "customary international law." See e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n. 3 ("In this opinion we use the terms 'law of nations' and 'customary international law' interchangeably."). 125 See Engle, supra n. 4, at 501-502. Indeed, as pointed out by Engle, the ATS itself supports the two branches of public international law by reference to treaties. Id. at 512-513 (" [T] he Kiobel court's willful blindness to international treaty law (jus inter gentes) is contrary to the black letter law of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) itself".). As pointed out by Eric Engle, this narrow focus may be misplaced. 127 Id. at 502 ("Private international law is most often accessed in the U.S. context through 'conflicts of law' i.e., the rules for allocating decisional authority in cross-jurisdictional contexts."). 128 Id. at 504 ("The schism between the ideas that first, states are the principal addressees of public international law, and second, that rights and duties may be ascribed to non-state actors under public international law is one key to understanding the significance of the Alien Torts Statute in the corporate context."). 129 See Brierly, supra n. 20, at 1. There is however, academic disagreement.
For centuries, there have been vast numbers of formally recognized actors in the international legal process other than the state, although far too many assume incorrectly that traditional or classical international law had been merely state-to-state and that under traditional international law individuals and various other non-state actors did not have rights or duties based directly in international agreements or customary international law.
142
Paust refers to the states only view as misguided: [F] or the last two hundred and fifty years international law has not been merely state-to-state. At best, claims to the contrary have been profoundly mistaken. At worst, they have been part of layered lies and attempts by malevolent myth mongers to exclude and oppress others, to deny responsibility, or to support radical revisionist ambitions. A claim that the only actors with formal participatory roles and/or recognized rights and duties other than the state have been natural individual persons is similarly mistaken. For example, this article has documented the manifest reach of international law to such non-individual entities as a company, corporation, union, vessel, court house, insurgent, belligerent, tribe, free city, people, and nation, among others. 143 As demonstrated above, the historic narrative of international law was that sovereign states constituted the sole actor capable of violating international law. 144 However, this historic portrayal no longer makes sense. 145 The next section explains how the ritualistic distinction between "states" and "corporations" no longer comports with our globalized world today and discusses the blurring of the distinction between sovereigns and corporations.
III. WHY THE FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE IS WRONG -TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL LAW ACTORS INCLUDE GLOBAL CORPORATIONS
The historical perspective consigning the sole actor status in international law to states was sensible when formal distinctions reflected the unique roles public actor sovereigns and private actor 136 See Ku, supra n. 18, at 356. 137 Id. at 354-55. 138 Ku, supra, n. 4, at 733. 139 Ku, supra n. 18, at 355. ("Indeed, customary law has only endorsed direct private-actor liability in the context of international criminal law, and even this somewhat-uncertain liability extends only to natural persons.") 140 Id. at 364. 
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See supra, nn. 126 -141 and accompanying text. 145 See Muchlinski, supra n. 6, at 687-688 (2011) (discussing recent cases in continental Europe where corporations have been defendants in suits claiming the corporations are liable for environmental damage, human rights abuses and war crimes). corporations played. However, the unique status of states as the actors in international law is a relic of a bygone era. 146 The state "has lost its monopoly" as the exclusive actor in international law.
147
Globalization and the blurring of the roles between states and corporations combine to make the "states only" paradigm of international law obsolete.
The old understanding of international law as something created solely by and for sovereigns is defunct. Today the production and enforcement of international law increasingly depends on private actors, not traditional political authorities. As with other public services that we used to take for granted-schools, prisons, energy utilities, and transportation networks-privatization has come to international law.
148
In the past, states constituted the sole actors in international law as states were the actors capable of causing damage. However, three dynamic forces militate in favor of finding the distinction between states and global corporations antiquated: corporations are highly influential and powerful, capable of causing colossal harm; 149 governments have outsourced many public functions 150 and governments have entered the private sector.
151
A. The global corporation and The State: A comparison of near equals Distinction between economically powerful states and large global corporations no longer reflects our interconnected global order. Thus, the states only paradigm "has become completely outdated in our time."
152 Key players in international law can be states, global institutions, global corporations, and individuals.
153 Non-state actors, including large corporations, wield increasing influence over international affairs. 154 International relations today are the product of "[a] complex matrix of trans-national (if not supra-national) networks and relations, created by a great variety of non-state actors; international public companies; transnational (TNCs) or multinational corporations (MNCs), non government organizations (NGOs), international institutions, etc."
155
Large global corporations, possessing enormous power and influence, and conducting business across virtual borders can be considered as quasi or virtual states.
Every day, Google, RIM, and Facebook are behaving more like sovereign nations than corporations-controlling populations, taxing citizens, and passing laws regulating insiders and outsiders who conduct commerce within their virtual borders. Their future independence will solidify their sovereignty from unilateral regulation by any other nation, terrestrial or otherwise. In short, Google, RIM, and Facebook can already act with relative impunity. Each has sufficient power that it is impossible for any traditional nation to truly control them. If you need evidence, witness China's failed attempt to ban Google when China's population demanded access. Or Facebook's frequent changes to their privacy policies, largely ignoring concerns of local regulators and legislators. The U.S. and the EU can pass all the rules they want on behavioral targeting, privacy, or data protection. As noted supra n. 142-43 and accompanying text, some have argued that any such distinction was erroneous.
147
See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639. Alvarez, supra n. 37, at 5.
150
See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003) ("Recent privatization efforts, particularly in health care and welfare programs, public education, and prisons, reveal a trend of greater discretion and broader responsibilities being delegated to private hands."). See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639.
153
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 185 (1996) . 154 Id.
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See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639. 156 See Douglas J. Wood, Say Hello to the World's New Sovereign Nations: Facebook, Google and RIM ("Say hello to the new sovereign nations of Google, RIM, and Facebook. Facebook now has more than five hundred million members, a population that would make it the third-largest nation in the world. Google, used everyday by hundreds of millions, is the most robust resource for knowledge in history, and forever expanding.") http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?i d¼ 1202475267603&Say_Hello_to_the_Worlds_New_Sovereign_Nations_Facebook_Google_and_RIM¼&src¼EMC-Emai l&et¼editorial&bu¼Corporate%20Counsel&pt¼Corporate%20Counsel%20Daily%20Alerts&cn¼cc20101124&kw¼Nati ons%3F%20Bah,%20They%20Can't%20Control%20ME!%20Welcome%20to%20War,%20Virtual%20World-Style Rights ("ECHR") for infringements on the corporation's rights. 158 The ECHR has enforced corporate rights extensively. " [T] he idea that companies and other entities qualify for protection under the ECHR has been so accepted within the Strasbourg court's jurisprudence that there is literally no discussion on the question in court opinions." 159 Interestingly, corporations might argue that if they are to be treated as state-like entities bearing state-like responsibilities, corporations also enjoy rights similar to states, such as sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law. 160 However, it is generally applied in a restrictive fashion, meaning commercial activity or private-sector activity is not subject to immunity.
161 "The restrictive theory is linked to the phenomenon of states entering the marketplace and taking part in commercial activities like private persons."
162 If the corporation is engaging in a "for profit" commercial endeavor, immunity should be inapplicable as it would fall within the rubric of restrictive sovereign immunity as it does for sovereign nations.
A significant measure of power is the extent of wealth attributable to an actor. 163 Against this benchmark, large global corporations' wealth often rivals the financial power of states. Coupled with technology, global corporate power and influence rivals, and may eclipse, state power. The European Convention on State Immunity ("ECSI") and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States ("UNCJIS") utilize this theory. See e.g., ECSI Art. 3 (contractual obligation) and Art. 7 (commercial activities within the forum state) and UNCJIS Art. 10 (commercial transactions). The United States also uses a commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity. See FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activities either within or with direct effect on the United States). 162 See Finke, supra n. 160. 
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See Vega, supra n. 62, at 386. 166 Chow, supra n. 13, at 817. ("The globalization of manufacturing operations by MNCs has been a hallmark of the modern age and has allowed MNCs to greatly increase their power and influence.") As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Citizens United, corporations are "the principal agents of the modern free economy."
170
In the technology-driven globalized world where money constitutes influence and power, the large global corporation wields awesome control. Indeed, ownership of large transnational enterprises constitutes authority. "In a global economy, ownership of companies is the most important way to have influence."
171
As corporations increased their public actor role, their "state-like power over their constituents of society did not wane, but instead increased."
172 Large global corporations shape and influence the nations that they operate in: 173 MNCs play a central role in the movement of capital and technology from developed countries to developing countries and thus have become major players in determining the economic, political, and social welfare of nations, particularly in developing nations that have a strong hunger for foreign capital and technology. 174 To be sure, there have been prior examples of corporations wielding state like power over private citizens. For example, the British East Indies Company ("Company") was a state-controlled company that was enormously influential over India and wielded both private and public actor power. "The East India Company foreshadowed the modern world in all sorts of striking ways . . . . Andparticularly relevant at the moment-it was the first state-backed company to make its mark on the world." 175 The Company was simultaneously involved in private market activity but also was enmeshed in administrative control, tax collection, and military power. 176 The similarities continue: the Company enjoyed business monopolies. "Many of today's state-owned companies are monopolies or quasi-monopolies."
177 The Company was thus remarkably similar to today's state-owned enterprise and serves as an example of an actor that yields both public and private power.
The Company serves as an exemplar of an actor simultaneously possessing public and private actor functions similar to today's large global corporation. However, as most historical comparisons, the parallels between the Company and today's state-owned firms are not exact. "The East India Company controlled a standing army of some 200,000 men, more than most European states."
178 Another distinguishing characteristic was the Company's shares were not owned by the British government but rather by some government employees. In contrast, "[t]oday's state-capitalist governments hold huge blocks of shares in their favourite companies." 179 In addition, while the Company controlled large swaths of India (and several other locales), today's large global corporation may have tremendous influence in many nations and over a substantially larger number of people. Moreover, today's global corporation is empowered through powerful technology which can dominate a nation's strategic industries such as financial, energy, communication and defense. The Company, while powerful and bearing similarities to today's large global corporation, did not have the same extent of influence held by today's large global corporation. "The current interrelated financial, economic, climate, energy, food, water, political, and security crises affecting the globe only highlight the historically unprecedented degree of interconnectivity and interdependence." Mark Landler, supra n. 52 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway. html?_r¼2&oref¼slogin&) (quoting Norwegian Finance Minister Kristin Halversen). 172 Jackson, supra n. 38, at 330. 173 See e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (Nigeria outsourcing healthcare to Pfizer). 174 Chow, supra n. 13, at 817. The global business, political and economic environments have drastically changed. The narrow view distinguishing between "sovereigns" and "corporations" must yield to the new realties: multiple actors exist spanning the globe that posses both public and private actor characteristics in varying degrees.
The world has since changed, and long-standing legal concepts are being increasingly challenged by dramatic cross-border developments that no longer allow domestic land laws to exist in isolation, but instead present pressing issues of cross-influences, regionalism, and universalism. 184 These hybrid actors operate across borders and utilize major bases of business operations over continents, and exert enormous influence. " [G] lobalization is indeed producing an incomplete yet significant form of authority deep within the national State, that is, a hybrid authority that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national nor fully global." 185 Moreover, not only do large global corporations possess enormous financial power, with the associated powerful influences, there is yet another reason to re-think the distinctions between states and corporations as private actors. As detailed in the next section, while historically a line of demarcation existed wherein corporations acted in the private sphere and states acted in the public realm, that line is becoming blurred.
B. The blurring of the distinctions between private and public actors Another factor militating in favor of finding global corporations as state-like actors is the evisceration of the traditional distinctions between public actor states and private actor corporations. Our world today no longer consists of pure private actors and pure public actors neatly divided and governed either by domestic or international law. Norway's SWF provides an example of this phenomenon.
Norway has provided an architecture of governance that sits astride the borders of market and state, of public and private, and of national and international. It's efforts to institutionalize this border-riding governance provides a window into the shape of cooperative and inter-systemic governance that is likely to play a greater role in shaping behavior in this century. 186 Private corporations are actors in the public arena taking a role in traditionally state functions. The public functions of education, policing and defense operations no longer depend exclusively on public actors within a specific nation state but are affected by private corporations conducting business across borders. Indeed, large multinational corporations have been referred to as virtual "states."
The privatization of prisons serves as an example of the outsourcing phenomenon.
In response to the explosion in prison population prompted by the drug enforcement policies of the 1980s and 1990s, governments began to rely more heavily upon the private sector for the provision of corrections services for adults. As a result, a significant number of state and federal prisoners are now in the custody of private entities.
203
Private policing exemplifies another manifestation of the private actor engaged in the public sector. Protection of citizens and their property-a traditional core governmental sphere-is increasingly conducted by private actors. As one corporate executive noted, "today much of the protection of our people, and their property and their businesses, has been turned over to private security." 204 The trend is global, and private sector policing is gaining popularity in many nations including Canada, Australia, and the U.K., 205 and includes criminal investigations and arrests. 206 It is generally recognized that, in the United States, "[u]niformed private guards . . . now routinely guard and patrol office buildings, factories, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train stations, airports, shipyards, shopping centers, parks, government facilities-and, increasingly, entire commercial districts and residential neighborhoods." 207 Governmental outsourcing spans a variety of areas such as: drafting health policies; performing military defense functions; implementing border control; immigration, and implementation of asylum policies.
In the U.K., the government has asked private sector food corporations to assist drafting policy on food and alcohol. 208 There is a trend whereby private actors are assisting or replacing states with respect to rights. A "primary example of such reconfiguration of human rights is the manner in which the enforcement of human rights in the crucial area of labour rights is moved from states and international organizations to market actors via the idea of CSR (corporate social responsibility)." 209 States are increasingly depending upon private contractors to perform traditionally state military functions. 210 "[I]t is clear that a broader array of non-state actors-from contractors to transnational terrorist organizations to regional bodies-are actively involved in today's battlefields." 211 Examples of public actor defense functions conducted by private entities include "truck driving to training for specialist military, police and security operations, communications support, aerial surveillance, intelligence, training, strategic planning, armed personal security, and conducting drone attacks." 212 Another illustration of corporate involvement in a traditional state function is the privatization of immigration and asylum. "It is clear that we are witnessing a gradual process in which states dilute their own exercise of sovereign power towards immigrants and transfer more authority to private and other non-state actors." 213 The privatization of border control and immigration has been well-documented. 214 "Border control, admission of immigrants, social integration, and distribution of benefits and membership rights to persons are all thought of in international legal doctrine as acts of state sovereignty." 215 states privatize these service providers, giving a franchise to operators who directly provide them," and " . . . . these service providers are profit-driven and profit-oriented, a consideration that does not always conform to international and domestic obligations towards refugees." 217 Although states were once the primary vehicle to impose obligations, global corporations are taking a substantial role. As detailed above, global developments have conferred ever greater "public actor" power in corporations and corporate "state-like power over their constituents" is ever-increasing. 218 It is incontrovertible that private corporations engage in activities once considered within the exclusive realm of official state actor. This demonstrates convincingly that private corporations no longer act solely as pure private actors.
2. States acting in the private sphere A similar disconnect between traditional roles has occurred in the private sector. The historical activities of the private sector-such as providing investment capital, trading for profit in the equity and debt markets, long-term ownership of shares in publicly traded corporations, venture capital, commodity extraction, real estate development and large scale farming-are no longer the exclusive roles of private individual and corporate actors. In these areas, sovereigns are increasingly taking on a private actor role similar to the roles of private individuals and corporations.
Larry Backer adroitly described this growing phenomenon:
This participation of states directly in markets (production, ownership, finance and the like) is not merely in the old and now fairly tame form of public, central planning-based, political regimes, or the sort of ownership that traditionally constituted state enterprises, i.e., mercantilist/Marxist-Leninist undertakings with a long and well understood history and purpose. What distinguishes this sovereign activity from its mid-20th Century form is the willingness of states not only to limit their control of internal economies, but also to invest their financial wealth outside their national borders. In this respect, states assume the very role of the private economic actors that they once feared so much. The 21st Century is witnessing a dramatic rise in the willingness of states to project economic power both at home and in host states through the same economic vehicles that threatened the states' power in the 20th Century. The facilitating cause of this change in approach is the creation of the very system that frees economic actors from the constraints of territory and more closely binds public actors thereto. Just as private economic entities may now cross borders to affect transactions that maximize their wealth, so states are now discovering that they might do the same thing. Economic globalization does not exclude private market participants from its system of freely moving capital. Just as private actors are subject to the regulation and control of the sovereign in whose territories they act, states acting outside their borders as participants in local economic activity assume a similar character. Consequently, some states seem to have become, to some extent, pools of national economic wealth, the power of which matches or exceeds their traditional sovereign power. 219 Indeed, similar to corporations, states have "reinvented" themselves and take on multiple roles including public, private and mixed. " [G] overnments are empowering themselves along multiple dimensions." 220 Both sovereign wealth fund investments and the state-owned enterprise illustrate how public actor states are now operating in the private sector.
a. Sovereign wealth funds: The blurring of distinctions between public and private actors 221 is further exemplified by the emergence of sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs"). SWFs are financial superstars which allow public states to engage in private market activity. 222 SWFs are "large pools of capital" owned and controlled by various public states. 223 The amounts of capital owned and deployed
These large business entities serve as examples of the partnership between the state and private sector and illustrate the alignment of interests between state controlled/owned corporations and the private sector. "There is a certain symmetry between private and state-owned MNE." 236 The SOE constitutes a form of traditional private corporate activity being conducted by the "state" as a private actor conducting business on an international scale. 237 Many global energy producers are state-owned national petroleum corporations. "Thirteen of the world's biggest oil companies are state-controlled. So is the world's biggest natural-gas company, Gazprom." 238 More generally, national energy companies are no longer content just to sit at home and pump the oil or gas. They are increasingly venturing abroad in order to lock up future energy supplies or forming alliances with private-sector specialists to increase their access to expertise and ideas. Gazprom has been buying up oil and gas companies across eastern Europe and Asia. In 2008 it bought a 51% stake in Naftna Industrija Srbije, a Serbian energy giant. Chinese oil companies have been striking deals across Africa: in 2006 Sinopec bought a huge Angolan oil well for $692 m. The multiplying alliances between national and international companies are not always successful: BP, for example, will not rush into any future deals with Russia's Rosneft. But they are plugging national energy companies into the global market for people and ideas and closing the gap between the state-run and the private sector. 239 SOEs thus provide yet another example of the erosion of the unique distinctions between states and private corporations. The SOE exemplifies the increasing phenomenon of states engaging in private actor functions on a global scale and underscores the erosion of the distinction between states and corporations. 240 Accordingly, the theoretical underpinning for holding that only sovereigns bear international legal obligations has similarly been eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Global corporations engage in misconduct that can cause severe harm in the nations those private entities operate in. Immunization from legal liability may play a role in the decision to conduct business in a foreign state. "Using sophisticated corporate structures often involving a parent holding corporation and various overseas manufacturing subsidiaries, MNCs have been able to set up transnational production chains that can bypass or evade national laws on labor and the environment." 241 The Bhopal disaster highlights the problem of a corporation that finds the cost of misconduct overseas less severe than in its home jurisdiction. 242 To impose legal obligations on "states" but disallow these same obligations on "corporations" is an inherently flawed approach. To treat the large global corporation as not being subject to international law will potentially allow multinationals to engage in liability arbitrage. Such corporations can transfer litigation risk by selecting jurisdictions to engage in misconduct known for weak sovereign power. Moreover, "[p]owerful multinational corporations can pressure captive developing country governments, desperate more for income than for labor or environmental protections, to adopt friendly legislation." 243 The corporate liability issue is significant because as noted by the Norwegian SWF, many corporations act in areas of weak governance permitting them to engage in or be complicit in misconduct. As Norway's Ethics Council notes:
[M]any of these companies were in direct violation of domestic law, the host state country did nothing to stop the violation of its own law and at time[]s supported the companies in their work.
